Cosmological "pure" numbers

> [ebtx]: What is the Meta Model's position here? Are the strengths of the various forces dependent on one another (as mutual functions) ... or ... are they just picked out of a hat at random and applied variously (in different combinations) on different scales?

The "forces" of nature arise from various media operating on various scales. For example, the strength of the gravitational force is a result of the flux density, mass, and average speed of gravitons in the graviton medium. Likewise, electrodynamic forces result from the "light-carrying medium", which exists on a much larger scale. The former is more like our atmosphere with its fast, discrete particles applying pressure everywhere. The latter is more like the ocean with its relatively fixed molecules, but with pressure increasing with depth.

In the MM, the universe has an infinite number of media operating on different scales over an infinite range of scales. On some super-media scale, galaxies colliding is providing "pressure" in much the same way as these other media do for us.

Moreover, just as it might appear to an amoeba in the middle of the Pacific Ocean that the medium it is immersed in comprises the whole universe, in fact no medium goes on forever. So the graviton and light-carrying medium, and indeed the media of stars and galaxies, are just features of the "local" neighborhood in an infinite universe. Sooner or later, they end and are replaced by something else. -|Tom|-

> [ebtx]: Then, do you view the universe and its observed properties as separate from abstract logical propositions which it then must obey, e.g. rules such as "non-contradiction", "identiy", "mathematical rules", etc.?

I am puzzled by your word "separate". Logic dictates the physical principles (causality, the finite cannot become infinite, no creation ex nihilo, etc.) All of reality must obey those principles. So in what sense is the universe "separate" from the principles it conforms to?

> [ebtx]: Or, are the logical rules which we distill from observation of the world around us ... also varied with scale?

Details are different in every place, at every time, and on every scale. But fundamentally, everything is the same and obeys the same rules of logic (not the same "laws of pgysics" because the media are different).

So one will find "particles" and "waves" at every scale because those are logical forms for substance to assume. But obviously one will not find "carbon" and "iron" on most scales because those are details.

> [ebtx]: I don't mean gravity or electromagnetism but rather addition, multiplication, Boolean logic, etc. Would logic itself vary with scale? Or, in the MM, can we always depend on abstract logic to be the same on every scale?

Logic is invariant because it does not depend on existence. If we found our universe failing to obey the rules of logic, we could safely conclude that our universe was not reality, but a sophisticated "holo-deck" created by some intelligence to present us with an artificial reality where the rules can be changed at the whim of the programmer. -|Tom|-

"Logic is invariant because it does not depend on existence." - TVF

This is very basic. Would you say that the reverse is true? Does physical existence depend on logic? , i.e. is it generated by it? or ... somehow demanded by it?

If A depends on B, wouldn't B depend on A?
If A does not depend on B wouldn't B not be dependent on A?

Where would we put "logic"?
The problem is similar to mind, I think. We have a brain but where is "mind". It seems to be associated with it yet, as Leibniz observed, "If one could see the brain, it would look like a mill." (meaning we'd just see a bunch of physical gears or whatever).

> ebtx]: Would you say that the reverse is true? Does physical existence depend on logic? , i.e. is it generated by it? or ... somehow demanded by it?

No.

> If A depends on B, wouldn't B depend on A?

If my basement floods when it rains, the flooding depends on the rain. But the rain doesn't depend on the flooding.

> If A does not depend on B wouldn't B not be dependent on A?

The preceding example shows the opposite.

> Where would we put "logic"?

It is one of the tools we have to discover the nature of reality. The others are our senses, useful for data collection. Logic allows analysis of that data, and allows us to draw conclusions from both actual data and from thought experiments.

According to some of that data, the universe existed just fine long before humans and their logic did. -|Tom|-

Would this then be a correct assessment of the basic principles of the MetaModel?

1) Abstract logic (which nature is constrained to obey but which is a strictly human invention having no actual "reality" of its own)

2) Physical interactions we presently observe but which may differ on other scales

3) Matter ... whose fundamental existence itself is, at base, acausal and may take other forms on other scales

4) Physics on one scale has no logical or interactive bearing on the physics of a different scale (I may have misinterpreted this. Perhaps you mean that the physics of one scale has a transition to another scale which would make different scales in some ways physically connected.)

> [ebtx]: Would this then be a correct assessment of the basic principles of the MetaModel?

No. I did not recognize MM in the words you chose.

> 1) Abstract logic (which nature is constrained to obey but which is a strictly human invention having no actual "reality" of its own)

This confuses the object with the tool we use to study the object. The nature of the universe (the object) must be as logic (the tool) dictates, whether or not the tool ever comes into existence. If no intelligent beings ever existed, that does not mean the universe could then have violated principles of physics, such as creating something from nothing.

> 2) Physical interactions we presently observe but which may differ on other scales

Only the "details" differ. The essence of all physical interactions (for example, having a wave or a particle character) must be the same on all scales. One MM theorem is that all scales are fundamentally the same.

> 3) Matter ... whose fundamental existence itself is, at base, acausal and may take other forms on other scales

On the contrary, in MM, "substance" (a generalization of matter that exclides the special properties, such as "gravitation" and "electromagnetism", seen at our scale) is virtually synonymous with "existence". Whatever exists is everywhere occupied with substance; and it is impossible for a true void, however small, to exist. What looks like "vacuum" to us is densely filled with light-carrying medium, gravitons, and even more numerous smaller entities that we have yet to discover.

> 4) Physics on one scale has no logical or interactive bearing on the physics of a different scale (I may have misinterpreted this. Perhaps you mean that the physics of one scale has a transition to another scale which would make different scales in some ways physically connected.)

On Earth, we have a "land" medium. It goes down quite a way. But if we walk far enough, we come to a "water" medium that is distinctly different in its properties. If we rise above that, we come to an "air" medium that is different yet. Beyond that is a "space" medium that is different still. The space medium, for example, is filled with gravitons, photons, atoms, molecules, dust, gas, meteoroids, asteroids, comets, moons, planets, stars, galaxies, galaxy clusters, and galaxy superclusters. Those are the forms so far identified. If we could see over a wider range of scales, we would surely see more forms. In a sense, these forms are all "mediums", and they can all produce forces by collisional interactions with other forms.

So if forms are too many levels of scale apart, these forces become undetectible. But in principle, everything that exists simply responds to all the forms (forces) that try to interact with it, with the forms most similar in scale generally having the biggest influence.

My summary comment would be that it is very difficult to get a sense of the Meta Model starting from some interior point in the way that you are doing. It will always look strange at the "edges" of whatever starting point you choose. I recommend starting from absolute nothingness, as described in "Dark Matter, ...". Working from there, the Meta Model picture becomes deductively inevitable instead of a series of inductive guesses. -|Tom|-